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Abstract This study explores the prospect of utilizing CCTV as an early intervention mechanism to detect and disrupt street-level activity that can lead to violence. The analysis focuses
on nine case studies in Newark, NJ, incorporating data from several sources, including video
footage, computer-aided dispatch (CAD) system incident data, CAD event chronologies and
face-to-face interviews with CCTV operators. The ﬁndings suggest that the beneﬁts offered
by CCTV, namely the instantaneous discovery and reporting of crime, may be rendered inconsequential by the process times associated with the differential-response policy of police dispatch.
Potential methods by which police can more proactively utilize CCTV to prevent crime are
discussed.
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Introduction
CCTV has emerged as a mainstream crime prevention tool in contemporary policing.
Whereas CCTV was once limited to retail stores and ofﬁce buildings, surveillance cameras
are now common ﬁxtures in public spaces around the world. The tactic’s rise can be traced to
Great Britain, where the Home Ofﬁce’s ‘CCTV Challenge’ provided direct funding for
CCTV projects between 1994 and 1997 (Painter and Tilley, 1999, p. 2). Continued government support and public enthusiasm for the tactic led to continued expansion in the following
years to the extent that CCTV is widely considered Britain’s ‘crime prevention initiative
of the century’ (Norris and Armstrong, 1999a). The use of CCTV as a crime prevention tool
appears to be gaining similar stature in the United States. Numerous major American cities
have invested in large CCTV systems, including Baltimore (La Vigne et al, 2011), Chicago
(La Vigne et al, 2011), Cincinnati (Mazerolle et al, 2002), Los Angeles (Cameron et al,
2008), Newark (Caplan et al, 2011), New Orleans (Usher, 2003), Philadelphia (Ratcliffe
et al, 2009), Washington DC (La Vigne et al, 2011) and San Francisco (King et al, 2008), to
name a few.

© 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 0955-1662 Security Journal Vol. 30, 1, 247–265
www.palgrave.com/journals

Piza et al

The evaluation research on CCTV suggests that the technology can have an effect on
crime in certain contexts. The meta-analysis of Welsh and Farrington (2009) found
that CCTV caused a 16 per cent reduction in crime across the 44 studies included in the analysis. However, this reduction was largely driven by the car park systems, which produced
a 51 per cent decrease in crime with most other settings experiencing small, statistically
insigniﬁcant crime reductions. Later evaluations produced ﬁndings that can be best classiﬁed
as ‘mixed’, with CCTV reducing crime in certain situations and having little effect in others
(Mazerolle et al, 2002; Ratcliffe et al, 2009; Caplan et al, 2011; La Vigne et al, 2011; Piza
et al, 2013; Reid and Andresen, 2014). This body of research has greatly contributed to our
understanding of CCTV’s deterrence effects. What is not as well understood is the precise
manner by which CCTV can prevent crime. In particular, little attention has been paid to
CCTV’s logistical role in policing, the beneﬁts it provides law enforcement, and whether
police are able to effectively make use of said beneﬁts.
This study expands upon previous research by examining an alternate use of publically
deployed video surveillance cameras. Speciﬁcally, this study explores the potential use
of CCTV as an early intervention mechanism in the prevention of serious street violence.
Through the coding of video footage, ofﬁcial police records and interviews with surveillance
operators, we explore how the proactive use of CCTV may provide police with legal grounds
to intervene in situations preceding serious acts of violence. We further explore whether
standard police deployment practices realize the opportunities from such opportunities. We
conclude with a discussion of how the proactive identiﬁcation of intervention opportunities
via surveillance cameras may be effectively incorporated into the police mission.

Review of Relevant Literature
In discussing the crime prevention utility of CCTV, Ratcliffe (2006) articulated, ‘a CCTV
system is not a physical barrier. It does not limit access to certain areas, make an object
harder to steal, or a person more difﬁcult to assault and rob … It seeks to change offender
perception so the offender believes if he commits a crime, he will be caught’ (p. 8). The focus
on offender perception aligns CCTV with the Rational Choice theory (Cornish and Clarke,
1986), which emphasizes offender decision-making in explaining crime commission.
Essentially, offenders consider the risk and rewards of a given criminal opportunity and
refrain from offending only when the costs outweigh the beneﬁts (Clarke, 1997). This riskcalculus involves a number of ‘choice structuring properties’, which include the pros, cons
and inherent risk involved in the commission of a particular crime. The decision to offend
is ‘the outcome of an appraisal process which…evaluates the relative merits of a range of
potential courses of action, comprising all those thought likely in the offender’s view to
achieve his or her current objective (for example, for money, sex, or excitement)’ (Cornish
and Clarke, 1987, p. 935). In regards to CCTV, this ‘appraisal process’ must result in the
potential offender determining that camera presence carries an increased level of risk for
deterrence to be achieved.
The deterrent capabilities of CCTV has predominately been tested through pre/post
measurements of crime in camera areas (Mazerolle et al, 2002; Gill and Spriggs, 2005;
Farrington et al, 2007; Ratcliffe et al, 2009; Caplan et al, 2011; La Vigne et al, 2011).
Although CCTV’s effect on crime counts is obviously a worthwhile research endeavor, the
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emphasis on outcomes has led to the under-exploration of the contextual mechanisms by
which deterrence can be achieved. For example, Pawson and Tilley (1994) offered eight
mechanisms by which CCTV can prevent crime1 while others have noted the importance of
swift police response and apprehension of offenders detected by CCTV (Tilley, 1993; Piza
et al, 2012). The exclusive emphasis on outcomes precludes the understanding of how such
procedural aspects of CCTV may inﬂuence deterrence.
Although the CCTV literature continues to be predominately outcome-based, a body
of knowledge has surfaced focusing on procedural aspects of the technology. This research
has typically focused on two issues: (1) the number of incidents detected by CCTV and
(2) the manner by which operators select targets for surveillance. This research has identiﬁed
some general ﬁndings. For one, despite the emphasis many operations place on the live
monitoring of cameras, operator activity is often low. This ﬁnding is consistent across
various operational deﬁnitions of activity, such as crimes reported to police by CCTV
operators (Piza et al, 2012), arrests in response to CCTV detections (Ditton and Short,
1999; Norris and Armstrong, 1999b; Piza et al, 2012), evidence or intelligence captured by
CCTV (Sarno et al, 1999; Waples and Gill, 2006; King et al, 2008), and proactive ‘targeted
surveillances’ conducted by CCTV operators (Norris and Armstrong, 1999a; Lomell, 2004;
Norris and McCahill, 2006). Researchers have provided a variety of explanations for the
consistently low-levels of activity, including the often high camera to operator ratio (Keval
and Sasse, 2010; Piza et al, 2012), the lack of formal training of operators (Bulos and Sarno,
1996; Loveday and Gill, 2004), lack of motivation on the part of operators (Norris and
McCahill, 2006), and the fact that operators are often tasked with responsibilities unrelated to
the proactive monitoring of cameras (Leman-Langlois, 2002; Gill et al, 2005). Regarding
target selection, studies commonly ﬁnd physical appearance, rather than behavior, to be
a common factor leading operators to focus upon speciﬁc individuals or groups. Certain
studies have suggested that race and ethnicity provoke operator attention (Norris and
Armstrong, 1999a, b) while others have found that styles of dress and unkempt appearances
lead to higher levels of surveillance, especially in the case of young males (Lomell, 2004;
Loveday and Gill, 2004; Smith, 2004). Such ﬁndings offer a certain level of support to antisurveillance positions (see ACLU, 2002; Lyon, 2003) and point to the importance of training
and supervision in the surveillance function.
Although observational studies provide important insight into operator decision making
and behavior, little is known on the precise manner by which the live monitoring of cameras
is integrated into the police function. A noteworthy exception is Gill and Spriggs (2005),
who conducted an in-depth process evaluation in conjunction with an impact evaluation of
13 CCTV systems in Great Britain. The process evaluation focused on control room design
and management as well as communication between CCTV operators and police ofﬁcers.
Their ﬁndings suggest that these procedural aspects are related to the overall efﬁciency and
effectiveness of the CCTV operations. Unfortunately, research has typically considered the
operator function separate from the crime prevention utility of CCTV, despite the fact that
operator actions may impact crime in a number of ways. For one, whether or not infractions
occurring within sight of cameras are discovered is largely dependent on CCTV operators.
CCTV operators can also guide responding ofﬁcers to the speciﬁc incident at hand and can
provide detailed information on the involved parties.
There is also the under-researched beneﬁt of CCTV identifying incidents in their early
stages, which can facilitate early intervention and prevent escalation to a more serious crime
© 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 0955-1662 Security Journal Vol. 30, 1, 247–265
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(Owen et al, 2006). In their discussion of risk and crime, Kennedy and Van Brunschot
(2009) discuss the potential for police to utilize CCTV to address underlying risk factors.
The authors build upon the framework of Sacco and Kennedy (2002), who explain crime
from a risk perspective in which events unfold in three stages, precursor, transaction and
aftermath. The standard use of CCTV predominately relies on the passive presence of
cameras to generate deterrence, which arguably does little to address risk factors present in
the precursor stage. Street-violence provides a telling example. Many violent crimes result
from precursor events, such as the escalation of relatively minor disputes (Jacobs et al, 2000;
Ratcliffe and Rengert, 2008). In this sense, CCTV can detect a quarrel before it turns into an
assault or an open-air drug transaction before it generates a robbery. Detection of precursor
events by CCTV operators may provide a means for police to prevent serious offending.
In fact, Gill and Hemming (2004) found that 25 per cent of street ﬁghts in Lewisham
occurring over the study period were ﬁrst detected and reported to police by CCTV
operators, showing how surveillance can offer police a ‘head start’ in addressing incidents
before they escalate to a point of serious injury. As argued by Kennedy and Van Brunschot
(2009), the ‘[a]ctive rather than passive use of this technology in managing public areas may
afford an important new resource in the reduction of risk’ (p. 141).
Recent research may provide a level of support (albeit indirectly) for the use of CCTV as
an early intervention tool. In their study of CCTV in three US cities (Baltimore, Chicago and
Washington DC), La Vigne et al (2011) found the systems that effectively reduced crime
were those that were actively monitored and heavily incorporated into the police function.
Conversely, the systems removed from proactive police activities produced no tangible
crime control beneﬁts. Piza et al (2013) found evidence of a similar intra-system mechanism,
with CCTV-generated enforcement actions being related to decreases in overall crime,
violent crime, and theft from auto within individual camera viewsheds in Newark, NJ. This
ﬁnding suggests that the individual camera sites most utilized in the proactive activities of
the surveillance unit experienced the largest crime control beneﬁts, with those detached from
proactive enforcement not generating crime reductions. The ﬁndings of these studies have
mostly been attributed to the increased certainty of punishment within CCTV areas, which
research has demonstrated to be of the utmost importance in generating deterrence (Durlauf
and Nagin, 2011; Apel, 2013). However, both La Vigne et al (2011) and Piza et al (2013)
gave little detail on the nature of the police enforcement activities relative to the CCTV
operations, meaning that the disruption of precursor risk factors may have also contributed to
the crime reductions.

Scope of the Current Study
This study explores the prospect of utilizing CCTV as an early intervention mechanism,
speciﬁcally through the exploration of nine case studies. We deﬁne case study in the
traditional sense of social-science research methodology, a multi-faceted investigation of
a relatively small number of cases, relying on the use of several data sources (Feagin et al,
1991; Hammersley, 1992). We acknowledge the often-cited limitations of the case study
method, speciﬁcally that the low N prevents the ﬁndings from being generalized (Platt,
2007). However, we also recognize the case study method as an avenue for the exploration of
unique patterns within cases for the purpose of better understanding the nature and scope of a
250
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social phenomenon of interest (Platt, 2007). Others have argued that the development of
evidence-based practice is contingent upon the use of diverse methodologies that can
generate useful information for practitioners (Lum and Kennedy, 2012). These observations
have particular salience in policing, where the ‘ordinary process of discovery’ can provide
insight into key aspects of crime problems even in the absence of statistically robust research
designs (Sparrow, 2011).
We analyzed video footage immediately preceding the commission of a violent crime at
the same location in Newark, NJ and explored how CCTV operator actions may offer police
opportunities for early intervention in such incidents. We compared the time frames between
the early intervention opportunities and the commission of a violent crime to median ofﬁcer
response times to gauge whether a police response to the precursor event could have
potentially prevented the ensuing violence. We also interviewed the operators who detected
the incidents to gain a sense of their decision-making relative to the observation and reporting
(or lack thereof) of the infractions preceding the violent crime incident. Collectively, the data
provide a basis on which to explore CCTV’s capacity to facilitate interventions.

Research Setting
This study focuses on the police-monitored CCTV system in Newark, NJ, which comprises
146 cameras. All of the cameras are PTZ units whose ‘pan’, ‘tilt’ and ‘zoom’ functions are
directly controlled by the user. The Video Surveillance Unit (VSU) of the Newark Police
Department monitors the video feeds of each camera. Over the study period, VSU was
staffed by two civilian video operators under the supervision of a police sergeant. The video
operators were tasked with monitoring the cameras for the purpose of detecting incidents of
crime and disorder. Upon detecting such an incident, operators report the event via the
department’s computer-aided dispatch (CAD) system. Reported incidents (both CCTV
events and 9-1-1 calls for service) are stored in CAD’s calls-pending-queue. These assignments are addressed in a differential response manner by the police dispatcher, with higher
priority incidents taking precedence over those with lower priority levels. This process is
considered standard operating procedure in police departments across the United States
(LEITSC, 2008). The video surveillance system also has the capability to store and save
footage. By default, all camera feeds are stored on the system for a 30-day period, at which
time the footage is overwritten. However, portions of footage can be exported and stored
indeﬁnitely onto hard drives or removable discs. In Newark, footage of crime incidents has
been exported and later used for investigative purposes by NPD detectives and as evidence
by municipal, county and federal prosecutors.

Data Sources and Methods
This study utilizes data from three separate sources, video footage immediately preceding
and including a violent crime, the Newark Police Department’s CAD system, and face-toface interviews with surveillance operators who conducted the surveillances. Each data
source underwent speciﬁc procedures of data collection and analysis, which are described
below.
© 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 0955-1662 Security Journal Vol. 30, 1, 247–265
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Incident footage
Footage used in this study was identiﬁed through VSU’s Video Control Ledger, which lists
all incidents burned on DVD for investigative and evidentiary purposes. Researchers had
access to records for incidents occurring from October 2007 through December 2009. In
total, 332 discs were labeled as pertaining to a Part 1 violent crime incident.2 However, the
vast majority of these were unusable for the purpose of the study. Although each disc
referenced a particular incident (for example, ‘Robbery, 10/1/07, 100 Main St’) most footage
covered a different time/area than that of the actual incident. This was done at the request of
detectives for investigative purposes. For example, while a crime may have happened on 10/
1/07 at 100 Main St, a detective may request footage from a camera in another area or from
another date to see if anything of evidentiary value (for example, a felony vehicle ﬂeeing the
scene, suspects returning to the crime scene, and so on) was captured on video. In total, only
13 discs were of a Part 1 violent crime incident actually detected by the CCTV cameras,
despite the fact that VSU records show that the unit detected 73 Part 1 violent crimes over the
study period. When asked about this discrepancy, the commanding ofﬁcer of VSU stated that
the unit only saves footage at the request of police ofﬁcers or detectives, which primarily
occurs when the CCTV system provides the sole source of probable cause for an arrest. For
example, if a police ofﬁcer does not apprehend the suspect in question, the footage of the
crime incident is not saved. In addition, while VSU may have detected a robbery in progress,
a responding ofﬁcer may have been told by the victim that a robbery occurred, granting him/
her grounds for arrest based on their personal knowledge of the event. In such an instance,
CCTV footage would not be saved since it was not the sole source of probable cause. In the
case of detectives, the VSU commander stated that they often responded to VSU following a
crime in order to view the footage ﬁrst hand. If the footage did not add anything of evidential
value to their investigation, they normally did not request a copy.
An additional four incidents were unusable for this study due to insufﬁcient time lengths
of the video. In these cases, CCTV operators captured only the crime in question without
any preceding surveillance taking place. This left nine violent crime incidents for use in
this study, three shootings (two fatal and one non-fatal), one shots-ﬁred incident (where
victims were shot at but not struck by gunﬁre), two robberies (one gun and one ‘strong arm’),
and three assaults (two beatings and one stabbing).
After identifying the necessary footage, researchers viewed and coded each incident,
attempting to identify speciﬁc events that provided police with legal grounds to intervene
before the occurrence of the violent crime. Such events were termed ‘intervention
opportunities’ and classiﬁed into two categories, those providing probable cause for police
enforcement (such as an arrest) and those providing reasonable suspicion for a police
response (to investigate whether further enforcement action is warranted). As per the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, probable cause is necessary for the search and
seizure of individuals suspected of a crime. Although the Fourth Amendment does not
explicitly deﬁne probable cause, it is considered as a law enforcement agent’s reasonable
belief that the law was violated based on facts that ‘are such that a reasonably discreet and
prudent man would be led to believe that there was a commission of the offense charged’
(Dumbra v. United States, 1925). Events providing probable cause in this study ranged from
a street ﬁght between two large groups to a woman throwing trash cans and undressing in
the middle of a busy thoroughfare. Reasonable suspicion refers to events that on their own
252
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don’t warrant formal sanction, but offer police ‘supported articulable facts that a criminal
offense has been or is about to be committed’ (Terry v. Ohio, 1968), thereby granting ofﬁcers
legal grounds to intervene. To use an example from this project, a motorist pulled over
at a corner where a group of males stood. One of the males walked to the car, leaned
over seemingly to speak to the front seat passenger, reached into his back pocket, and then
‘shook hands’ with the passenger after which the vehicle immediately drove off. Although
this act in itself is not illegal, the behavior is indicative of a hand-to-hand drug transaction
and provides legal grounds for police to stop and question the persons involved. After noting
all of the intervention opportunities, researchers watched the footage with the video operator
who captured the incident and asked him or her to conﬁrm or invalidate each intervention
opportunity and identify any incidents the researchers failed to notice.
For each intervention opportunity, the researchers recorded the time of the event and
calculated the number of minutes before the violent crime occurred. The total number of
minutes between the intervention opportunity and the violent crime incident constituted the
‘minutes to incident’ (MTI) variable, which quantiﬁed how long police had to intervene
before the crime occurred. For example, if a drug transaction occurring at 21:00 is observed
on video, and a shooting occurs at this same location at 21:10, the MTI is 10 min.

Computer-aided dispatch (CAD) system
The CAD system is used to support police dispatch and response functions while storing
key data on all events brought to the attention of the police. In addition to incident data, such
as event number and ﬁnal disposition, CAD also contains narrative data denoting
all communications between the complainant, police dispatcher and responding ofﬁcers
(Boba, 2009, p. 92). The Newark Police Department’s CAD system was utilized for two
distinct purposes. Firstly, we measured if the MTI offered by each intervention opportunity
provided a realistic time frame for police to arrive before the occurrence of the violent
crime. In fulﬁllment of this task, we incorporated data on Newark police ofﬁcer response
times utilized by Piza et al (2012), who analyzed all CCTV detections and 9-1-1 calls
occurring in CCTV areas of Newark from 2007 through 2010 to test whether enforcement rates differed across these two reporting methods. We speciﬁcally utilized three
temporal variables compiled by Piza et al (2012): queue time (the number of minutes
between the reporting of the event and police dispatch); response time (the number
of minutes between police dispatch and ofﬁcer arrival on scene) and process time (the
numeric sum of the queue time and response time variables).3 In order to tailor the data to the
current study, we only included the 10 7994 incidents occurring between 2007 and 2009 in
the analysis.
To determine the feasibility of ofﬁcers arriving on scene before the occurrence of the
violent crime incident, each intervention opportunity had its corresponding MTI compared
with the median process time associated with incidents sharing its same priority level. For
example, in the hypothetical situation outlined previously, the unveriﬁed drug transaction
had a priority level of four, as determined by the Newark Police Department’s assignment
codes. If the median response time for priority four incidents was 8 min, we would conclude
that police would have likely arrived before the crime occurrence, due to the transaction
occurring 10 min before the shooting.
© 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 0955-1662 Security Journal Vol. 30, 1, 247–265
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Event chronologies for each violent crime incident were the second data source extracted
from CAD. Event chronologies contain narrative data on pertinent factors relayed by the
involved parties. Each comment is time stamped within CAD (in ‘hh:mm:ss’ format),
providing a precise time for its occurrence. We were speciﬁcally interested in the actions
taken by CCTV operators preceding the violent crime incident and noted such on each event
chronology. We noted additional comments made by operators that conveyed information
pertinent to the police response and/or follow-up investigation, such as suspect description
and direction of ﬂight. Similar information obtained from 9-1-1 calls were also recorded to
provide a comparison for the CCTV data.

Operator interviews
The primary author of this article conducted face-to-face interviews with each operator
who detected an incident included in this study. In total, interviews lasting between 30 and
45 min were conducted with seven of the nine operators assigned to the VSU during the
study period. The interviews had a fairly unstructured manner, although similar questions
were asked in each interview. In addition to being asked to validate or dismiss each intervention opportunity identiﬁed by the researchers, operators were asked to discuss their
decision-making relative to the monitoring of speciﬁc persons and locations as well as the
reporting or overlooking of observed infractions. Additional questions related to unique
portions of the footage, or were follow-up questions to operator comments.

Findings
The identiﬁcation of intervention opportunities
Researchers identiﬁed 16 intervention opportunities preceding a violent crime incident, with
12 providing probable cause and four reasonable suspicion. CCTV operators agreed with all
but one of the probable cause incidents. In the disputed incident, researchers saw a man
holding a stick on a street corner and classiﬁed this as possession of a weapon. The operator
disagreed with this classiﬁcation, stating: ‘He’s just carrying it (the stick). He’s not doing
anything wrong or acting in a suspicious manner … you really don’t know what he’s doing
with it. You just don’t have enough evidence at this point to say this is something criminal’.
An operator noted an additional probable cause incident, an animated dispute between
bouncers and a patron ejected from a bar, which was not detected by the researchers. This
incident was added to the list of intervention opportunities.
In respect to reasonable suspicion, an incident identiﬁed as a potential hand-to-hand drug
transaction was dismissed by the operator who captured the footage. The research notes
describe the behavior considered suspicious by the researcher: ‘The man who was previously
standing alone on the corner walks back into the frame. He is walking and talking with a man
who is wearing a hooded gray sweatshirt. When they reach the corner, the two men shake
hands. After the hand shake, the man in the hooded sweatshirt seems to put something
in his pocket. The man wearing the long black coat then enters the passenger side of a
minivan, which immediately drives away’. The researcher interpreted this incident as a drug
254
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transaction due to ‘hand shakes’ commonly being used to exchange money and/or drugs
between dealers and customers, and because one male seemed to place something in his
pocket immediately afterwards. When asked why he did not agree with the researcher’s
assessment, the operator stated ‘Those guys looked like they knew each other, like they were
a part of the same gang. The customers are different from the dealers … they don’t associate
outside of the transaction. And transactions are quick. They don’t usually hang out talking to
the individuals they’re purchasing from’. In another incident, the operator noted two possible
drug transactions not identiﬁed by the researcher. In one case, a male was frequently seen
walking behind a building with other persons in the courtyard of a public housing complex.
After one such occurrence, the male is seen walking from behind the building back into the
courtyard while another man quickly walks towards the exit of the complex. The operator
pointed out that the person exiting was walking very briskly and looking around as if to make
sure no one was watching him. The operator interpreted this as a drug transaction, with the
dealer (from the courtyard) and the customer (the person exiting the complex) meeting
behind the building to escape the view of passer-bys and, possibly, the surveillance camera.
Several minutes later, this suspected dealer took an unidentiﬁed object out of his pants
pocket and passed it to a person on a bicycle who then rode towards three people who
seemed to be waiting for him on the other side of the complex. The operator also interpreted
this as a drug transaction, with the male on the bicycle serving as a runner making the
transaction on behalf of the dealer.
After adjusting for operator observations, this study included 17 unique opportunities for
police intervention: 12 incidents of probable cause and ﬁve incidents of reasonable
suspicion. As displayed in Table 1, all but one of the violent crimes was preceded by at
least one intervention opportunity with ﬁve having multiple.5 Intervention opportunities
occurred an average of 7.04 min before the violent crime.6
Although these aggregate statistics illustrate that intervention opportunities preceded most
of the crime incidents, they don’t measure the prevention utility of each observation. Thus,
each intervention opportunity’s MTI was compared with the median process time variable
Table 1: Intervention opportunities per each violent crime incident
Incident

Crime type

A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I

Shooting
Shooting
Shots ﬁred
Shooting
Gun robbery
Assault (beating)
Strong arm robbery
Assault (stabbing)
Assault (beating)

Total (Avg.)

Incidents of RS a

Incidents of PC b

Total IOc

Average MTI d

1
1
0
2
1
0
0
0
0

0
3
3
0
0
0
1
3
2

1
4
3
2
1
0
1
3
2

4.51
15.78
NA
1.07
0.23
0
11.13
2.13
5.39

5 (0.56)

12 (1.33)

17 (1.89)

(7.04)

a

Reasonable suspicion.

b

Probable cause.

c

Intervention opportunities.

d

Minutes to incident.
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described in the methods section. It was decided that the median was a more valid
comparison for the MTI than the average since it is less susceptible to the inﬂuence of
outliers. If the MTI was smaller than the median process time, we concluded that a police
ofﬁcer responding to the particular intervention opportunity would have likely arrived on the
scene prior to the occurrence of the violent crime incident.
As displayed in Table 2, only two of the 17 intervention opportunities exhibited an MTI
less than the median process time for their respective priority levels. Both of these intervention opportunities occurred in the same crime incident. Therefore, in eight of the nine incidents
intervention opportunities did not surface early enough for a police unit to be reasonably
expected to arrive before the commission of the crime. These ﬁndings suggest that CCTV may
be ill-suited as an early intervention mechanism. However, further review of the data suggests
that the differential response method of police dispatch may be to blame for the process times
being larger than the MTI values. Speciﬁcally, the amount of time incidents spend in the callspending-queue may negate the potential beneﬁts offered by CCTV. All of the intervention
opportunities had priority levels between three and ﬁve, which have substantial queue times
(see Table 3). Priority ﬁve’s average queue time of 9.43 min is more than twice the average of
the overall incidents. Furthermore, priority four (21.90 min) and priority three (20.85 min)
incidents have queue times more than four times the overall average. The queue time accounts
for the majority of the process time, rendering the response time inconsequential. This
becomes even more evident when comparing the MTI with the response time instead of the
process time. Seven intervention opportunities across four violent crimes had MTI’s smaller
than the median response time. These ﬁndings suggest that the minimizing of the queue time
could have potentially led to four times as many incidents where an ofﬁcer could have
realistically been expected to arrive before the violent crime occurred.

The lack of formal reporting of identiﬁed intervention opportunities
Despite the fact that eight of the nine crimes were preceded by incidents warranting
police action, CCTV operators formally reported early intervention opportunities in only
three cases. Prior to a fatal shooting, the operator reported a person acting in a disorderly
manner and a later-occurring ﬁst ﬁght involving this same individual. In two other incidents,
an operator reported an argument between bouncers and a person ejected from a bar, and
an argument between two large groups outside of a housing complex. For all other incidents,
ofﬁcial operator action is not recorded in CAD until after the commission of the violent
crime.7
The absence of an operator action in three of the incidents is easily explained. In one,
multiple drug transactions occur only 14 seconds before a gun robbery, giving the operator
little time to alert the police. In the case of a disorderly woman, operators were closely
observing her running in and out of trafﬁc, nearly being struck by automobiles several times,
and (understandably) did not notice what appeared to be a drug transaction occurring across
the street. Finally, a heated argument between ejected night club patrons and a bouncer was
already reported via 9-1-1 by someone on the scene; there was no reason for the CCTV
operator to report the incident a second time.
In respect to the eight remaining intervention opportunities (which spanned ﬁve separate
incidents) the infractions occurred well before the more serious crime took precedence.
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Bar
Housing complex
Housing complex
Housing complex
Housing complex
Bar
Bar
Bar
Housing complex
Housing complex
Housing complex
Bar
Housing complex
Housing complex
Housing complex
Housing complex
Bar
Bar

A
B
B
B
B
C
C
C
D
D
E
F
G
H
H
H
I
I

Probable cause/Reasonable suspicion.
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Median response time.

Shooting
Shooting
Shooting
Shooting
Shooting
Shots ﬁred
Shots ﬁred
Shots ﬁred
Shooting
Shooting
Gun robbery
Assault (beating)
Strong arm robbery
Assault (stabbing)
Assault (stabbing)
Assault (stabbing)
Assault (beating)
Assault (beating)

Crime type

*The time is shorter than the minutes to incident.

f

Minutes to incident.

Median process time

e

d

Priority level.

c

b

Intervention opportunity.

a

Setting

Incident
Suspicious person
Fight
Drug transaction
Disorderly person (Mental)
Disorderly person (Mental)
Argument
Fight
Fight
Drug transaction
Drug transaction
Drug transaction
NA
Fight
Argument
Argument
Fight
Argument
Argument

IOa
RS
PC
RS
PC
PC
PC
PC
PC
RS
RS
RS
NA
PC
PC
PC
PC
PC
PC

PC/RSb

Table 2: Minutes to incident (MTI), median process time and median response time of each intervention opportunity

4
5
4
5
5
3
5
5
4
4
4
NA
5
3
3
5
3
3

PLc
5.75
21.38
18.12
16.88
6.72
9.72
1.75
0.40
5.43
4.43
0.23
NA
11.13
2.90
2.82
0.67
5.97
4.82

MTI d
32.28
17.42*
32.28
17.42*
17.42
29.97
17.42
17.42
32.28
32.28
32.28
NA
17.42
29.97
29.97
17.42
29.97
29.97

MED. PT e

5.27
4.72*
6.48*
4.72*
4.72*
5.27*
4.72
4.72
6.48
6.48
6.48
NA
4.72*
5.27
5.27
4.72
5.27*
5.27

MED. RT f
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Table 3: Queue, response and process times of incidents occurring in CCTV areas
PL a

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

FREQ.

14
268
1327
2341
3181
2079
1568
21

Queue time

Response time

Process time

AVG.

SD

MED.

AVG.

SD

MED.

AVG.

SD

MED.

1.70
42.62
51.75
45.93
28.82
4.87
2.17
0.68

4.96
76.09
77.77
66.45
51.09
12.60
6.68
0.56

0.00
10.72
20.85
21.90
9.43
1.73
0.97
0.60

1.88
7.69
8.00
9.12
6.70
6.50
5.42
6.09

4.55
11.19
12.69
11.69
8.80
9.93
8.28
12.53

0.02
5.02
5.30
6.40
4.67
4.12
3.68
1.95

3.58
50.31
59..75
55.05
35.52
11.37
7.59
6.77

8.91
77.14
78.86
67.26
52.41
16.63
10.64
12.55

0.02
22.49
29.97
32.28
17.42
6.62
5.12
2.30

a

Priority level.

For each of these unreported intervention opportunities, operators were asked why they did
not report the observed activity, particularly since they agreed with the researchers’
assessment of their illegality. Operators overwhelmingly reported that aspects of police
dispatch – speciﬁcally large queue times – discouraged them from reporting many of the
intervention opportunities. In respect to the incident where suspected drug dealers and
customers met behind a building to seemingly conduct a drug transaction, the operator said,
‘since we couldn’t see it directly, if we did put it into CAD it would be a low priority because
we’d have to put it in as unveriﬁed (narcotics activity). So I waited to see if I could see
something more concrete’. In a separate interview, when discussing his reasoning for
reporting an intervention opportunity, this same operator stated ‘if the queue is low, and you
see something on camera, you might as well (report the incident)’. In another incident, the
operator observed a group of individuals rolling and subsequently smoking what appeared to
be a marijuana-ﬁlled cigar. After stating that she often views these same individuals
engaging in similar behavior, the operator was asked why she didn’t report the incident, to
which she responded, ‘Because by the time the radio car gets there they’ll be long gone’. In
total, four of the seven operators directly referenced queue times when explaining their
reasoning for not reporting an intervention opportunity.
Operator beliefs regarding the negative inﬂuence of queue times on police response are
supported by an example from this study. The previously discussed disorderly behavior of a
woman was reported by an operator at 21:45. At the time of a subsequent shooting, which
occurred over 21 min later at the same location, an ofﬁcer had yet to be dispatched in
response to the disorderly person offense. As reported by the operator, a string of higher
priority incidents prevented police from responding to this intervention opportunity: ‘[On
the night in question] we already had a shooting prior [to the incident in question]. All the
units in this precinct were tied up either [responding to] that job or others [incidents with
higher priority codes]. That’s why it sat for 22 minutes…we had a lot of higher priority jobs
going on’.
Although a lack of ofﬁcial operator involvement before crimes was evident, CCTV
played an important role following the commission of each incident. Following each violent
crime, CCTV operators provided pertinent information about the event, such as detailed
descriptions of suspects, speciﬁc direction of ﬂight and precise locations of weapons used in
commission of the crime. For example, in one incident, a shootout occurred between two
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Table 4: The reporting of intervention opportunities and comments pertaining to the violent crime by CCTV
operators and 9-1-1 callers
Incident

Reported intervention
opportunities
CCTV

9-1-1

Comments made
before crime
CCTV

9-1-1

Comments made
after crime
CCTV

9-1-1

A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I

0
4
0
0
0
0
1
1
0

0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0

0
2
0
2a
0
0
2
1
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

3
5
4
2
4
3
1
1
1

0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Average

0.67

0.11

0.63

0.00

2.67

0.22

a

Although the intervention opportunity in this incident was reported via 9-1-1, the CCTV operator provided a
detailed description of the suspects and their vehicles.

disputing individuals, with only one being injured. After being shot in the leg, the victim,
who actually ﬁred his weapon ﬁrst, threw his gun into an open apartment door before
crawling into the same apartment. The CCTV operator alerted the dispatcher to the victim’s
true role in the incident, leading to his on-scene arrest and recovery of the ﬁrearm. In the two
additional incidents, camera operators were credited with providing suspect and vehicle
descriptions in addition to the precise direction of ﬂight, which led to the apprehension of
ﬂeeing offenders. Apprehension would have been unlikely without this information, due to
the responding ofﬁcers being dispatched to the location where the incident occurred rather
than the suspects’ escape routes. In comparison, 9-1-1 calls provided similar information in
only a single instance, where a caller provided a physical description of a suspect. In all other
instances, 9-1-1 callers merely reported that an incident took place (for example, ‘Someone’s
been shot’) without providing anything of value to the immediate police response or followup investigation (Table 4).

Discussion of Results
Identiﬁed intervention opportunities in this study illustrate how CCTV may be used to
prevent street violence. Twelve of the intervention opportunities were crimes in themselves,
granting police probable cause to intervene. Five were incidents granting sufﬁcient reasonable suspicion for police to respond. Although a police response would not have guaranteed
the prevention of the violent crime (the perpetrator could have attacked at a different location
or after the police left), we ﬁnd it reasonable that the incident would have been less likely to
occur had the police been present. Seven of the nine incidents had at least one intervention
opportunity involving persons directly involved in the impending violent crime: three involved victims while nine involved both victims and the pending suspects.8 Therefore, responding ofﬁcers could have potentially removed the ‘motivated offender’ and/or ‘suitable target’
© 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 0955-1662 Security Journal Vol. 30, 1, 247–265
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from the situation at hand, or provided the necessary ‘capable guardian’ (Cohen and Felson,
1979) to deter the involved parties.
Unfortunately, the standard dispatch function of law enforcement does not make adequate
use of the intervention opportunities discovered by CCTV, speciﬁcally since the differential
response approach produces large queue times for most reported incidents. A potential
solution may be for police to abandon differential response in CCTV-detected incidents by
dispatching an ofﬁcer immediately upon observation of an incident of concern. However,
this policy would likely be a tough sell to citizens living outside of CCTV areas who are not
likely to consider their emergencies as less important just because they were not captured on
video. Immediate response in CCTV areas would also place additional burden on patrol units
working in other areas of the city by tasking these ofﬁcers with responding to a larger
number of high-priority incidents.
A more viable solution may be to incorporate the video surveillance function into current
proactive operations of the department, which echoes recommendations offered in prior
research (for example, Gill and Spriggs, 2005; La Vigne and Lowry, 2011; La Vigne et al,
2011; Piza et al, 2012). In Baltimore, for example, surveillance operators routinely worked
in conjunction with ofﬁcers from the narcotics and bicycle patrol units, speciﬁcally by
monitoring cameras in areas patrolled by these units and directly alerting ofﬁcers when an
incident was observed (La Vigne et al, 2011). The direct communication between the CCTV
operators and street-level ofﬁcers prevented the delay inherent in the differential-response
policy of police dispatch. Given the lessons learned in Baltimore, similar proactive
options seem to be available in the current study setting. For example, the Newark Police
Department commonly deploys ‘suppression units’ for the purpose of identifying and
addressing criminogenic conditions that may generate violence. These units have reduced, or
no, responsibilities for responding to calls-for-service, but are tasked with enacting proactive
enforcement actions within high-crime areas. These units could be integrated into the
surveillance operation, so that they are notiﬁed when an operator detects an incident of
concern. Police departments with existing CCTV infrastructure can make similar attempts to
identify their pre-existing proactive operations that can best support, and beneﬁt from, the
integration of live CCTV monitoring.
It should be acknowledged, however, that in the current ﬁscal climate police departments
(speciﬁcally American police departments) may not have the ability to conduct proactive
operations as often as they are accustomed to. This is especially evident in the current study
setting. Owing to massive police layoffs, the Newark Police Department was forced to
discontinue one of their main proactive policing efforts, a saturation foot-patrol initiative
named Operation Impact (Piza and O’Hara, 2012, p. 21). In the context of the current study,
this represents one less program to potentially integrate with CCTV. Although it is unclear
whether the situation in Newark is representative of the policing ﬁeld as a whole, the recent
economic decline has forced many police agencies to reconﬁgure their strategies in order to
account for funding cutbacks (Wiseman, 2011). It is possible that such reconﬁgurations may
result in the elimination, or downsizing, of certain proactive operations.
In recognition of such issues, police may be able to address potential pre-cursor events
by soliciting the participation of other entities within CCTV target areas. In the event that
the police themselves are not able to swiftly address a particular incident, the partnering
entities can be notiﬁed and asked to intervene. A similar system of shared intervention
responsibilities has been reported in prior research, speciﬁcally in the United Kingdom
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(Sarno et al, 1999; Gill et al, 2005; Norris and McCahill, 2006). For example, Norris and
McCahill (2006, pp. 105–106) reported that interviews with CCTV system managers
revealed a form of ‘hybrid policing’ in which CCTV operators report incidents to a wide
range of partners. In a shop lifting incident, for example, the business manager, private
security guards in the shopping center and police ofﬁcers on patrol in the town center were
all notiﬁed of the incident and suspect description. This allowed for a joint response in which
the multiple parties support one another. Granted, many of the precursor incidents reported
in the current study (for example, drug transactions and street ﬁghts) are not situations that
non-police entities, such as business managers, can realistically address. However, given the
nature of the CCTV sites, other law enforcement entities may have shared jurisdiction
over the area. The Housing Authority, for example, operates a police force with jurisdiction
within all Public Housing complexes in Newark. Furthermore, bars often employ armed
security guards (who are oftentimes off-duty police ofﬁcers) to provide guardianship within
their premises. Since these entities have an interest in preventing serious crime at and around
their facilities, police may be able to solicit their cooperation in addressing potential precursor incidents detected by CCTV operators.
The ﬁndings of this study also have implications relative to the active CCTV monitoring
functions. Norris (2003) argued that CCTV operators ‘rely on a set of normatively based,
contextual rules to draw their attention to any behavior that disrupts the “normal.” Put
simply, behaviors are suspicious if they are unusual. But given that most people who are
running are merely trying to catch a bus, those obscuring their face merely trying to mitigate
the effects of a biting northerly wind, and those loitering, waiting for their friends, it is hardly
surprising that such strategies are largely unproductive in identifying the deviant’ (p. 265).
Somewhat contrary to this position, interviews in the current study suggest that CCTV
operators may be able to effectively identify instances of suspicion and criminal behavior.
Each respondent displayed in-depth knowledge of the places and persons captured on video.
When asked why they chose to observe certain cameras over others, each operator stated that
they knew which areas were more prone to crime. A number of operators went beyond this
general statement and provided speciﬁc examples. One operator stated the following when
explaining why he observed a particular bar: ‘This particular location has been very busy.
We’ve had multiple calls for drug transactions, assaults in progress…a couple of weeks ago,
there was a guy standing by that door [a side entrance] and [he] was showing off something
in the back seat of his car to a few people. When the ofﬁcers got there they saw a gun lying
on the ﬂoor board of the car. Also, the gang detectives told us that this is a new Blood [gang]
hangout and that this particular set is feuding with another set on [nearby street]. I make
sure to watch this camera whenever I get the chance because there’s a high likelihood of
violence here’. Operators also displayed similar knowledge of particular people observed
on camera, as displayed by the following quote: ‘This guy is here all of the time. A few
months ago [before the incident in question] he was shot in the leg right in the courtyard [at
the same location]. That’s why he’s wearing that cast – he’s still recovering from the
shooting, obviously. It hasn’t slowed him down, though. He’s still out here with his crew
every day selling drugs. It seems like they work for [name of a drug dealer]. Whenever he
drives into the complex they walk right up to his car like they’re checking in or something’.
Egon Bittner (1970) once declared that police ofﬁcers typically know ‘the shops, stores,
warehouses, restaurants, hotels, schools, playgrounds, and other public places in such a way
that they can recognize at a glance whether what is going on within them is within the range
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or normalcy’ (p. 90). Remarks by Newark’s CCTV operators suggest that they developed
a similar sense of CCTV target areas by monitoring these same places on a daily basis.

Conclusion
This study explored the prospect of utilizing CCTV in a preemptive manner to identify and
address street-level incidents of concern preceding serious violent crime. Footage of nine
violent crime incidents provided case studies suggesting that CCTV may hold promise as an
early intervention mechanism. However, we note that it would be unwise to draw ﬁrm
conclusions from such a small study. Despite this absence of generalizability, we believe that
the study contributes positively to the ﬁeld. Speciﬁcally, this study shows that CCTV does
not function within a vacuum and provides food for thought regarding how the deployment
of CCTV can occur in a manner that maximizes its effectiveness. It may not be enough for
police to solely rely on the conspicuous presence of cameras to produce deterrence. Indeed,
the mere existence of intervention opportunities in the current study suggests that offenders
have little problem committing crime in sight of CCTV.9 Therefore, police should begin to
think of how CCTV policies can incorporate proactive aspects of police response rather than
emphasizing surveillance cameras as a stand-alone tactic. CCTV seems able to identify and
direct police to risky situations that can generate crime. The early identiﬁcation of such
incidents by CCTV operators can afford police an opportunity to address the situation at
hand and prevent escalation (Owen et al, 2006). Unfortunately, standard police procedures
relating to crime reporting and ofﬁcer dispatch seem ill-ﬁt to address such situations. By
altering the manner by which CCTV is utilized, police may be able to improve upon the
crime prevention beneﬁts of video surveillance systems.
The current study also has implications for the research community. Although research
has predominantly focused on program outcomes (that is, achieved crime reductions) CCTV
programs involve a range of activities, including the selection and maintenance of camera
sites, monitoring of video footage by operators, response to incidents of concern by police
ofﬁcers, and the use of footage as evidence in prosecution. Since they all are likely related to
program effect, to some extent, the ﬁeld would beneﬁt from increased analysis of such procedural aspects of CCTV. From a theoretical perspective, such research can help solve what
McGloin and Thomas (2013) refer to as the ‘black box problem’ where research focuses on
program effect absent an understanding of the contextual mechanisms and theoretical
underpinnings of the intervention. Increased research on CCTV’s contextual mechanisms
may help to develop what Gill and Spriggs (2005) refer to as ‘transferable lessons that enable
good practice in one area to be repeated in another’ (p. 6). Given the substantial worldwide
investments in CCTV, such an approach seems prudent.
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Notes
1 See Phillips (1999, p. 126) for a list and brief explanation of these mechanisms.
2 As deﬁned by the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniformed Crime Report, Part 1 violent crime is comprised of
four offenses: murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault (see: http://
www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/violent-crime/violent-crime).
3 See Piza et al (2012, pp. 9–11) for a more detailed description of the operationalization of these variables.
4 A total of 12 450 incidents occurred in CCTV areas during the study period. However, 1651 were excluded from
the analysis due to the call being canceled before an ofﬁcer was dispatched or arrived on scene. Cancelation
primarily occurs for two reasons. One, the reporting party informs the police that a response is no longer necessary. Two, CCTV operators may notify the dispatcher that no visual evidence exists to support a complainant’s
claim that a crime occurred. For example, a caller may report a large ﬁght at a certain street corner only for
a CCTV operator to report that no such incident is taking place.
5 In the lone incident lacking an intervention opportunity, the camera operator was monitoring the outside of a bar
following a 9-1-1 call about a dispute occurring within the establishment. A patron was ejected from the
establishment and later returned with a baseball bat and attacked the bouncers. The lack of an observed
intervention opportunity is likely attributable to the fact that the events leading to the assault occurred indoors and
not in the public space viewable by the operators.
6 The MTI variable was converted from hours/minutes/seconds format to a continuous numeric value for
the purpose of maintaining clarity. In this sense, the time interval of 1 min and 30 seconds is represented as
‘1.5 minutes’ since 30 seconds is one-half (0.5) of a full minute.
7 Although this ﬁnding may surprise some, prior research has produced similar ﬁndings. Gill et al (2005), for
example, found that operators across 13 control rooms only informed police of 24 per cent of the offenses they
observed.
8 Incident F did not have an identiﬁed intervention opportunity while a couple involved in a domestic dispute on a
busy street corner in incident ‘G’ were not involved in a robbery that later occurred at the same location.
9 Although we are not able to deﬁnitively state that the offenders knew cameras were present, site visits to the crime
scenes conﬁrm that the incidents occurred within feet of the cameras. Therefore, we ﬁnd it reasonable to assume
that persons on the scene were knowledgeable of the cameras.
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